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Recent theories about the relation between emotion and behavior hold that social behavior
is influenced not only by the experience of emotion, but also by the anticipation of emotion.
We argue that anticipating future emotional states is an emotion regulation strategy when
it leads to a change in behavior. In the current studies we examined how construal of a
fair or an unfair situation in terms of positive or negative anticipated emotions influences
the fairness of subsequent behavior. We used the Ultimatum Bargaining Game – an exper-
imental game in which participants divide a resource between themselves and another
person – as a social situation that offers the opportunity to engage in fair and unfair behav-
ior. In Study 1 we used an autobiographical recall task to manipulate anticipated emotions.
Although the task did not influence anticipated emotions directly, results showed that
anticipated pride about fair behavior increased levels of fairness, whereas anticipated pride
about unfair behavior decreased levels of fairness. Similarly, anticipated regret about fair
behavior decreased levels of fairness, whereas anticipated regret about unfair behavior
increased levels of fairness. In Study 2 we replicated this pattern of findings, and found
that participants who thought about their anticipated emotions (pride or regret) in relation
to unfair behavior behaved more fairly. We discuss these findings in relation to theories of
emotion regulation and economic decision-making.
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INTRODUCTION
One way of regulating emotions is to anticipate how one’s actions
will make one feel and to adjust one’s behavior accordingly. In
terms of Gross and Thompson’s (2007) process model of emo-
tion regulation, this form of regulation belongs to the category of
“situation modification,” which refers to efforts to change a situ-
ation so as to modify its emotional impact. Anticipating how you
would feel if you were to behave one way rather than another,
and then deciding to act in the way that evokes desired emotions
and avoids undesirable emotions is therefore an emotion regula-
tion strategy. Although this way of regulating emotions applies to
a wide variety of settings, both intrapersonal and interpersonal,
we focus in the present research on interpersonal behavior, where
the emotions concerned are ones relating to outcomes for the self
vs. outcomes for another person. We focus on pride and regret
relating to decisions to act fairly, in the sense of an equal dis-
tribution of resources between self and other, or unfairly, in the
sense of retaining a larger proportion of the resource for oneself.
We show that the extent to which one anticipates feeling proud
or regretful about either course of action is related systematically
to how one then decides to allocate resources between self and
other.
Our theoretical reasoning derives from theory and research on
anticipated emotions. In particular, we draw on the dual-process
model proposed by Baumeister et al. (2007). These theorists dis-
tinguish between“automatic affect” and“conscious emotion.” The
former is quick and can operate without awareness. The latter is
slower, requiring more processing resources, and is by definition
something of which the individual is aware. These two types of
affective reaction are seen as having different relationships with
behavior. As Baumeister et al. (2007, p.169) put it,“[E]motion may
be rather too slow to guide behavior directly in a fast-changing sit-
uation, because time is required for the cognitive processing of the
event to lead to physiological changes such as arousal, which in
turn may activate motor responses. In contrast, automatic affect
will arise almost instantaneously and therefore be available to steer
behavior even at a moment’s notice.”
If conscious emotion is too slow to have a direct impact on
behavior, what is its function? Baumeister et al. (2007) argue that
its most important function is to establish the conditions for
being able to anticipate future emotional reactions and thereby
the capacity to modify one’s behavior so as to evoke desired emo-
tions and avoid undesirable ones. This is achieved by stimulating
conscious reflection about one’s past behavior and by leaving an
“affective residue.”Acting in a way that is regretted and gives rise to
guilt stimulates reflection about the action and tags the action with
a negative affective residue. This is a resource that can be drawn
on in future settings that involve similar features: “Emotion pro-
vides feedback about recent actions and, by implication, about the
adequacy of the current if-then rules on which those actions were
based. . . . Positive emotions generally validate the existing rules
because those emotions signify that what the person did turned
out well, and so the existing rules were presumably effective. . . .
Negative emotions signal that one’s behavior was not successful,
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and hence they suggest that the if-then rules need to be revised”
(Baumeister et al., 2007, p. 173).
Adults have all experienced past situations in which that have
had to choose between acting in their own interests, regardless
of others, or in the interests of others. Each course of action has
advantages and disadvantages in the form of material and psycho-
logical outcomes. Depending on individual dispositions, these past
experiences are ones that may have aroused pride (about having
stood up for oneself, or about having acted fairly) or regret (about
having been unfair, or about having ceded too much to the other).
There is a large literature demonstrating that the anticipation of
regret is a powerful motivator of strategic social decision-making
(e.g., Zeelenberg, 1999). Although there is less research on the
effects of anticipated pride in such situations, there is reason to
believe that anticipated pride plays an important role in encour-
aging behavior that conforms to social standards (Tangney et al.,
2007). On the basis of Baumeister et al.’s (2007) dual-process
model,we argue that these past experiences of pride and regret gave
rise to conscious reflection about how one acted (e.g., counterfac-
tual thinking), and (in the case of regret) a revision of the if-then
rules that guided the past action. When similar decisions have to be
made in the future, people anticipate how they would feel if they
were to act in accordance with these if-then rules. Anticipating
these emotional consequences is likely to play a role in how people
decide (see also Mellers et al., 1999; Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003).
Based on the above reasoning, we predicted that individuals
who anticipate pride about acting fairly would be more likely to
divide resources between themselves and another in a fair way,
whereas those who anticipate regret about acting fairly would
be less likely to do so. Similarly, we predicted that individuals
who anticipate pride about acting unfairly would be less likely to
divide resources between themselves and another in a fair way,
whereas those who anticipate regret about acting unfairly would
be more likely to do so. We conducted two online studies to inves-
tigate these hypotheses. In both studies participants played an
economic game, the Ultimatum Bargaining Game (UBG; Güth
et al., 1982), which was used as a measure of fairness of resource
allocation. It could be argued that other moral emotions might
also be relevant in social bargaining situations such as the UBG.
These include self-conscious emotions such as shame and guilt,
and anger-related responses such as moral outrage. Note, how-
ever, that we are interested in the interaction between the salience
of social norms concerning fairness and unfairness and the antic-
ipation of emotions associated with actually behaving in a fair or
unfair manner. We therefore chose emotions that are applicable
to both fair and unfair behavior. Pride and regret are psychologi-
cally plausible responses to both fair and unfair behavior, whereas
emotions such as shame, guilt, or moral outrage, apply to unfair
behavior but not to fair behavior.
There is a body of research on the role of emotion in the UBG,
but that work has focused for the most part on the roles of anger,
aggression, and reputation management on the part of respon-
ders in rejecting offers perceived to be unfair (e.g., Pillutla and
Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey et al., 2003; Burnham, 2007). By con-
trast, our focus is on the role of emotions on the part of proposers,
and how these emotions shape the offers they make. Recent work
suggests that emotions do play a role in determining the offers
made by proposers. For example, Martinez et al. (2011) found
that proposers who were led to experience regret made higher
offers than proposers in a neutral emotional state, whereas pro-
posers who were led to experience disappointment made lower
offers than their emotionally neutral counterparts.
More directly relevant to the current research is work reported
by Nelissen et al. (2011, Study 1), in which they observed that
proposers’ offers were influenced by the fear that they anticipated
experiencing if their offers were rejected and the guilt they antic-
ipated experiencing if their offers were thought to be inadequate.
This provides initial evidence in support of the argument that
proposers take the likely emotional consequences of their deci-
sions into account when making offers. The explanation offered
by Nelissen et al. (2011) for their findings was that anticipated
fear and guilt reflect underlying concerns (concern for rejection,
and concern for other player, respectively). This explanation is
compatible with the present argument that anticipated emotion
shapes the decision-making process by signaling to proposers how
they would feel if they were to act in one way rather than another.
This affective forecasting (Wilson and Gilbert, 2005) is presumably
based on past experiences of offers being accepted or rejected and
the emotions that were directly experienced as a result. The antic-
ipated fear and guilt observed by Nelissen et al. (2011) stemmed
from variations of the UBG that gave rise to heightened concern
for self (fear) or concern for others (guilt). In the current research
we examined a related but different issue. The point made by Nelis-
sen and colleagues is that higher offers in the UBG may be driven
by fear (of having one’s offer rejected) or guilt (about the oppo-
nent’s outcomes). Our objective is to show that within the context
of fairness (which presumably enhances concern for others) or
unfairness (which presumably reduces concern for others), the
emotion one anticipates experiencing will shape one’s offer level.
If you anticipate feeling proud about acting unfairly, you will offer
less than you would if you anticipated feeling regret about acting
unfairly. In contrast, if you anticipate feeling proud about acting
fairly, you will offer more than you would if you anticipated feeling
regret about acting fairly. To study this we examined the influence
of both positive and negative anticipated emotions relating to both
fair and unfair offers.
In the first of the present studies we manipulated anticipated
emotions by first asking participants to engage in an autobiograph-
ical recall task. Anticipated emotions about fair or unfair behavior
were measured before participants made an offer in the UBG. In
the second study we investigated the effect of reminding partic-
ipants about specific anticipated emotions (pride or regret) on
subsequent fairness behavior. We manipulated anticipated pride
and regret by having participants report their anticipated pride,
their anticipated regret, or no emotion, before making an offer in
the UBG. Both studies were approved by the Ethics Committee of




The study had a 2 (Behavior: fair vs. unfair)× 3 (Emotion: pride vs.
regret vs. control) between-subjects design, and was administered
online. Participants were 210 people (131 female, 77 male, 2 undis-
closed; age range: 18–77 years, median: 35 years; nationality: 85.7%
British) who were recruited through an online loyalty program. As
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compensation for their time, participants received loyalty points
that can be used for online shopping.
Materials
To manipulate behavior and anticipated emotion we asked par-
ticipants to recall an incident from their own lives in which they
had acted either in a way that was fair or unfair to others, and felt
either proud or regretful as a result. Depending on behavior con-
dition, we specifically asked participants to think back to a time
when they behaved fairly (fair condition) or unfairly (unfair con-
dition). Depending on emotion condition, we specifically asked
participants to think back to a time when they felt proud (pride
condition) or regretful (regret condition), “because you voluntar-
ily gave up something that otherwise could have been yours” (fair
condition) or “because you gained something for yourself that
otherwise would not have been yours” (unfair condition). In the
control condition participants also recalled an event in which they
had acted fairly or unfairly, but no mention of emotions was made.
As manipulation checks we asked participants to rate the extent to
which they behaved fairly and unfairly in the recalled situation and
the extent to which they had felt proud and regretful. The response
scale for all measures ran from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).
Participants then played the UBG. This experimental game sim-
ulates a single-round negotiation; participants play for a resource
that has monetary value. The game involves two roles, the “pro-
poser” and the “responder.” The proposer divides the resource
between the two players and this division is presented as an offer
to the responder. The responder can accept or reject the offer. If the
responder accepts the offer the resource is divided as proposed; if
the responder rejects the offer neither player receives anything. In
this study the resource for which participants played was £100, rep-
resented by 50 monetary units (MU) of £2 each. We explained to
participants that at the end of the study we would randomly select
two pairs of participants, and that we would divide the resource
between the players in accordance with how they had played the
game. Because we were interested in the number of MU that the
proposer was willing to share with the responder as a measure of
fair behavior, all participants were assigned the role of “proposer.”
Participants reported their anticipated emotions directly before
playing the UBG. Because we were interested in anticipated emo-
tions about fair and unfair behavior, we asked participants to
report how they would feel if they were to divide the MU equally,
or how they would feel if they were to keep most of the MU for
themselves. Depending on behavior condition, we asked: “If you
were to divide the MU equally between yourself and the respon-
der (for example, if you would offer a 25–25 split), to what extent
would you feel. . .” (fair condition), or “If you were to divide the
MU in such a way that you keep most for yourself (for example,
if you would offer a 45–5 split), to what extent would you feel. . .”
(unfair condition). We asked participants to report their antici-
pated emotions on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) for
10 different emotion terms: pleased, proud, regretful, sorry, satisfied,
relieved, embarrassed, foolish, guilty, and ashamed.
Procedure
Participants first received general information about the study,
confirmed that they were 18 years of age or older, and consented to
participate in the study. Demographic information was collected,
and participants completed a measure of Social Value Orienta-
tion (because this construct was not involved in our hypotheses,
the results relating to this measure will not be reported). They
then described the autobiographical event involving fair or unfair
behavior and their experienced feelings of pride or regret (except
in the control condition). In the next part of the study they
learned about the rules of the UBG. Participants were led to
believe that they were randomly assigned to their role; however,
all participants were allocated to the role of “proposer.” Next, par-
ticipants completed a set of comprehension checks that captured
the most important aspects of the UBG (“What is your role in the
game?”, “How many MU are there to divide?”, “How many MU
will you receive if the offer is rejected?”) and received feedback
on their answers to ensure that everyone was fully aware of the
rules. Participants then reported their anticipated emotions, and
made their offer in the UBG. After an open question about their
thoughts and feelings concerning the game, participants indicated
the minimum MU they would accept as an offer if they were a
responder in the UBG. The £100 resource was paid to the ran-
domly selected pairs of players in accordance with the responses
they gave (e.g., if the participant selected as a proposer had offered
a 30proposer:20responder division of MU and the participant selected
as a responder had indicated that he/she would accept a minimum
offer of 35proposer:15responder MU, then the £100 would be divided
£60proposer:£40responder). Then participants completed manipula-
tion checks and a second measure of Social Value Orientation.
Finally, participants were thanked and debriefed.
RESULTS
Participants and data treatment
An independent judge, blind to condition, read the autobiograph-
ical reports of participants, and coded whether the stories made
reference to fair or unfair behavior. Participants who did not
provide an answer, could not think of a situation, or gave an
unintelligible answer were excluded from analyses. One hundred
fifty-two participants remained in the analyses. Three anticipated
emotion items were combined into a single pride scale (pleased,
proud, and satisfied ; α= 0.90), and two items were combined into
a single regret scale (regretful and sorry ; α= 0.93).
Manipulation checks
We tested the effects of conditions on the manipulation checks
with 2 (Behavior: fair, unfair)× 3 (Emotion: pride, regret, con-
trol) ANOVAs. The manipulation check for fair behavior revealed
the expected main effect of the behavior manipulation, F(1,
146)= 42.29, p < 0.001, η2= 0.23. In the fair condition, partic-
ipants reported having behaved more fairly (M= 4.32, SD= 1.15)
than in the unfair condition (M= 2.91, SD= 1.48). No other
effects were significant. The reverse pattern was found for unfair
behavior. As expected, participants reported behaving more
unfairly in the unfair condition (M= 3.03, SD= 1.49) than in the
fair condition (M= 1.61, SD= 1.11), F(1, 145)= 43.39, p < 0.001,
η2= 0.23, and no other effects were found.
The manipulation check for pride revealed the expected
main effect of emotion condition, F(2, 146)= 12.14, p < 0.001,
η2= 0.14. Participants felt more proud in the recalled situation
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in the pride condition (M= 3.71, SD= 1.32) than in the
regret (M= 2.37, SD= 1.51) or control conditions (M= 3.12,
SD= 1.51). There also was a significant main effect of the
behavior manipulation, F(1, 146)= 27.35, p < 0.001, η2= 0.16,
showing that participants felt more pride in the fair autobio-
graphical stories (M= 3.57, SD= 1.36), than in the unfair sto-
ries (M= 2.40, SD= 1.52). The interaction was not significant.
The manipulation check for regret revealed a similar pattern,
but in the reverse direction. As expected, participants felt more
regret in the recalled situation in the regret condition (M= 3.27,
SD= 1.58) than in the pride (M= 2.63, SD= 1.52) or control
conditions (M= 2.47, SD= 1.56), F(2, 146)= 3.36, p= 0.038,
η2= 0.04. Again, the main effect of behavior was significant, F(1,
146)= 13.42, p < 0.001, η2= 0.08. Participants felt more regret in
the unfair stories (M= 3.34, SD= 1.48) than in the fair stories
(M= 2.39, SD= 1.54). The interaction was not significant.
Dependent variables
Anticipated emotions. We investigated the effect of behav-
ior and emotion on anticipated pride and regret in two sepa-
rate 2× 3 ANOVAs. For anticipated pride the predicted main
effect of emotion condition was not significant, F < 1, ns. Par-
ticipants in the pride condition (M= 3.54, SD= 1.16) did not
anticipate more pride than participants in the regret (M= 3.33,
SD= 1.35) or control conditions (M= 3.59, SD= 1.17). However,
there was a significant main effect of behavior, F(1, 144)= 70.39,
p < 0.001, η2= 0.33. Participants anticipated more pride in the
fair (M= 4.08, SD= 0.94) than in the unfair condition (M= 2.66,
SD= 1.10). The interaction was not significant. For regret, too,
the predicted main effect of emotion condition was not signif-
icant, F < 1, ns. Participants in the regret condition (M= 2.41,
SD= 1.49) did not anticipate more regret than participants in
the pride (M= 2.19, SD= 1.15) or control conditions (M= 2.10,
SD= 1.22). However, there was again a significant main effect
of behavior condition, F(1, 140)= 145.49, p < 0.001, η2= 0.51.
Participants anticipated more regret in the unfair (M= 3.29,
SD= 1.10) than in the fair condition (M= 1.43, SD= 0.74). The
interaction was not significant.
Offer level. The number of MU allocated to the responder ranged
between 5 and 30, with a median of 25, and a mean of 24.26. We
investigated the effect of behavior and emotion on offer level in a
2× 3 ANOVA. There were no significant effects (all Fs≤ 1.00).
We then investigated the combined effects of behavior condi-
tion, emotion condition, and self-reported anticipated emotion
on offer level using multiple regression. We regressed offer level
on behavior condition, emotion condition, self-reported antici-
pated emotion, and their interactions in two separate analyses:
one with the measure of anticipated pride and its interaction
terms, the other with the measure of anticipated regret and its
interaction terms. We entered the main effects for the predic-
tors in step 1 (R2= 0.01, ns), the two-way interactions between
these terms in step 2 (∆R2= 0.20, p < 0.001), and the three-way
interaction term in step 3 (∆R2= 0.004, ns). For the regres-
sion involving anticipated pride there was a significant two-way
interaction between behavior and self-reported anticipated emo-
tion, β= 0.33, SE= 0.06, p < 0.001. This interaction is depicted in
Figure 1. The simple slope of anticipated pride was significantly
positive in the fair condition, β= 0.39, SE= 0.09, p < 0.001, while
the simple slope of anticipated pride was significantly negative in
the unfair condition, β=−0.27, SE= 0.09, p= 0.003. There were
no other significant two-way interactions involving anticipated
pride, and the three-way interaction between behavior condition,
emotion condition, and anticipated pride was not significant.
For the regression that involved anticipated regret we again
entered the main effects for the predictors in step 1 (R2= 0.004,
ns), the two-way interactions between these terms in step 2
(∆R2= 0.16, p < 0.001), and the three-way interaction term in
step 3 (∆R2= 0.003, ns). Here, there was a significant two-way
interaction between behavior and self-reported anticipated emo-
tion in the opposite direction, β=−0.38, SE= 0.09, p < 0.001.
This interaction is depicted in Figure 2. The simple slope of
anticipated regret was significantly negative in the fair condition,
β=−0.43, SE= 0.13, p= 0.001, while the simple slope of antic-
ipated regret was significantly positive in the unfair condition,
β= 0.24, SE= 0.10, p= 0.017. There were no other significant
interactions that involved anticipated regret, and the three-way
interaction between behavior condition, emotion condition, and
anticipated regret was not significant.
DISCUSSION
Despite the fact that the manipulation check data showed that
participants recalled autobiographical events in accordance with
the experimental instructions, the autobiographical recall task did
not directly influence anticipated emotions and the manipulation
had no direct effect on offer level. However, and in line with our
predictions, the more that participants anticipated feeling proud
about acting fairly, the more fairly they distributed the resources,
whereas the more that they anticipated feeling proud about acting
unfairly, the less fairly they distributed the resources. With regret
the same pattern was found, but in reverse.
In better understanding why the autobiographical recall task
did not influence anticipated emotions, it may be useful to consider
the distinction between “exogenous” and “endogenous” emotion,
as drawn by de Hooge et al. (2008), who argue that “Influences of
emotions are denoted as endogenous when they concern behav-
iors in situations that are related to the emotion-causing event”
(p. 935). In the present context, it could be argued that the auto-
biographically recalled event and its accompanying emotion were
exogenous to the ultimatum game that participants played. Gen-
eralizing from the finding that exogenous shame is less likely than
endogenous shame to influence prosocial behavior (de Hooge
et al., 2008), it could be reasoned that the exogenous nature of
the autobiographical recall procedure used here might have been
responsible for the lack of influence on anticipated emotion in
the UBG.
Another possible explanation for the fact that the manipulation
was not successful in changing levels of anticipated emotion is that
we measured anticipated emotions with a range of items and this
may have served to“undo” the effect of the emotion manipulation.
The results of the anticipated emotion measure suggested that it
was easier to arouse pride in the fair than in the unfair condition,
and regret in the unfair condition than in the fair condition. By
asking participants to reflect on their anticipated emotions (and
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FIGURE 1 | Offer level (number of MU allocated to responder) as a function of anticipated pride and behavior condition in Study 1.
FIGURE 2 | Offer level (number of MU allocated to responder) as a function of anticipated regret and behavior condition in Study 1.
measuring both pride and regret), we may have led participants to
revert to the “default” of anticipating pride in the fair condition,
and regret in the unfair condition.
In Study 2 we therefore used a different manipulation of
anticipated emotion: we measured only anticipated pride, or
anticipated regret, or no emotion (as appropriate). In this way
we ensured that the manipulation of anticipated emotion was
endogenous to the experimental task participants had to com-
plete. At the same time, by restricting the number of anticipated
emotion items we ensured that there would be less interfer-
ence from other emotion terms. We predicted that measuring
pride in the fair condition would increase offer level, whereas
measuring regret in the fair condition would decrease offer





The study had a 2 (Behavior: fair vs. unfair)× 3 (Emotion: pride vs.
regret vs. control) between-subjects design. Participants were 132
students of a British university (124 female, 7 male, 1 undisclosed;
age range: 18–33 years, median: 19 years). Participants received
course credit (as partial course requirement) in exchange for their
time. The study was administered online.
Materials
We again used the UBG and the number of MU that proposers
were willing to share as a measure of fair behavior. The resource
(£1) was represented by 50 MU with a value of 2 pence each. Again,
in a seemingly random assignment to the roles of “proposer” and
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“responder,” all participants were actually assigned the role of pro-
poser. Because we did not collect information about the minimum
offer that participants would accept (as we had done in Study 1)
all participants received the maximum possible winnings (£1) at
the end of the study in addition to their course credit.
Before participants divided the resource, they indicated their
anticipated emotions. Depending on behavior condition we asked
them to consider the following: “If you were to divide the MU
equally between yourself and the responder (for example, if you
would offer a 25–25 split), to what extent would you feel. . .” (fair
condition), or “If you were to divide the MU in such a way that
you keep most for yourself (for example, if you would offer a
45–5 split), to what extent would you feel. . .” (unfair condition).
Depending on emotion condition, we asked participants to report
either their anticipated pride (pleased and proud) or their antici-
pated regret (regretful and sorry) on a scale from 1 (not at all) to
5 (extremely). In the control conditions no anticipated emotion
measure was administered. Instead, in the fair control condition
participants were asked to consider dividing the MU equally, and
in the unfair control condition to consider dividing the MU in
such a way that they would keep most for themselves.
Procedure
After sign-up, participants received a link to the study website.
On entering the website, participants received general informa-
tion about the study and provided consent for participation. We
recorded demographic information, and explained the UBG. We
told them that their offer would be communicated to another
participant by email, and participants provided their contact
details for this purpose. All participants then learned that they
were randomly allocated to the role of proposer. We checked
for participants’ comprehension of the UBG using the same
checks as in Study 1. Then participants reported their anticipated
emotions, before making their offer in the UBG. Some addi-
tional measures were taken (e.g., an open question about their
thoughts and feelings about the game, and Social Value Orienta-
tion), but because these measures are unrelated to the present
hypotheses they will not be discussed further. Finally, partici-
pants were debriefed, provided with payment information and
thanked.
RESULTS
Participants and data treatment
We excluded participants who shared all of their tokens (three
participants) or kept everything for themselves (two participants)
because such behavior likely reflects insufficient understanding of
the game or lack of motivation to take the game seriously. For the
remaining participants, offers ranged between 1 and 30 MU, with
a median of 25, and a mean of 22.63. Anticipated emotion items
were combined to create an anticipated pride scale (α= 0.70), and
an anticipated regret scale (α= 0.88).
Dependent variables
Anticipated emotions. We investigated the effect of behavior
condition and emotion condition on anticipated emotion with
a 2 (Behavior: fair, unfair)× 2 (Emotion: pride, regret) ANOVA
(because we did not collect anticipated emotion data in the
control conditions, these were not included in the ANOVA).
There was a significant main effect of behavior, F(1, 76)= 9.71,
p= 0.003, η2= 0.11, and a significant main effect of emotion,
F(1, 76)= 24.60, p < 0.001, η2= 0.25, but these main effects were
qualified by a significant behavior by emotion interaction, F(1,
76)= 56.23, p < 0.001, η2= 0.43. Simple main effects revealed
that participants anticipated more pride in the fair (M= 3.67,
SD= 0.58) than in the unfair condition (M= 2.84, SD= 1.20),
F(1, 76)= 8.77, p= 0.004, whereas participants anticipated more
regret in the unfair (M= 3.32,SD= 0.86) than in the fair condition
(M= 1.31, SD= 0.52), F(1, 76)= 39.50, p < 0.001.
Offer level. We investigated the effect of behavior and emotion on
offer level in a 2× 3 ANOVA. There was a significant main effect
of behavior, F(1, 121)= 19.36, p < 0.001, η2= 0.14, and a signifi-
cant main effect of emotion,F(2,121)= 8.52,p < 0.001,η2= 0.12.
These effects were qualified by a significant two-way interaction,
F(2, 121)= 6.53, p= 0.002, η2= 0.10 (see Figure 3). Simple main
effects revealed that there was no effect of emotion in the fair con-
dition (F< 1, ns; M pride= 23.70, SDpride= 2.25; M regret= 24.29,
SDregret= 1.79; M control= 23.64, SDcontrol= 3.51), but that there
was a significant effect of emotion in the unfair condition, F(2,
121)= 11.69, p < 0.001. Follow-up analyses revealed that in the
unfair condition participants offered fewer MU in the control
condition (M control= 16.47, SDcontrol= 5.96) than in either the
pride (M pride= 22.09, SDpride= 5.86; p < 0.001), or the regret
conditions (M regret= 23.15, SDregret= 4.36; p < 0.001).
We again investigated the combined effect of behavior, emo-
tion, and the anticipated emotion measure on offer level using
multiple regression. We entered the main effects for the behav-
ior and emotion conditions and anticipated emotions in step
1 (R2= 0.06, p= 0.17), the two-way interactions between these
terms in step 2 (∆R2= 0.20, p < 0.001), and the three-way inter-
action term in step 3 (∆R2= 0.12, p< 0.001). This revealed a
significant three-way interaction, β= 0.67, SE= 0.18, p < 0.001.
FIGURE 3 | Offer level (number of MU allocated to responder) as a
function of behavior and emotion condition in Study 2. Error bars
represent±1 SE.
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To decompose this interaction we regressed offer level on behav-
ior, anticipated emotion, and its interaction separately for each
emotion condition. We entered the terms for the main effects
in step 1, and their interaction term in step 2. The results repli-
cated the pattern observed in Study 1. In the pride condition (step
1: R2= 0.26, p= 0.002, step 2: ∆R2= 0.20, p < 0.001) there was
a significant two-way interaction between behavior and antici-
pated emotion, β= 0.70, SE= 0.18, p < 0.001. This interaction is
depicted in Figure 4. Simple slopes revealed that while there was a
trend for a positive association between anticipated pride and offer
level in the fair condition, β= 0.54, SE= 0.32, p= 0.10, there was
a negative association between anticipated pride and offer level in
the unfair condition, β=−0.86, SE= 0.16, p < 0.001. For regret
(step 1: R2= 0.15, p= 0.076, step 2: ∆R2= 0.08, p= 0.082) there
was a marginally significant two-way interaction between behav-
ior and anticipated emotion in the reverse direction, β=−0.51,
SE= 0.28, p= 0.082. This interaction is depicted in Figure 5.
Simple slopes revealed that there was no association between
anticipated regret and offer level in the fair condition, β=−0.20,
SE= 0.48, ns, whereas there was a significant positive association
between anticipated regret and offer level in the unfair condition,
β= 0.82, SE= 0.30, p= 0.010.
DISCUSSION
As in Study 1, there was a clear relation between anticipated emo-
tions and the subsequent offer, and the direction of this relation
depended on the fair/unfair context: in the fair condition, the more
participants anticipated to feel pride, the more MU they tended to
allocate to the responder; whereas in the unfair condition, the more
participants anticipated to feel pride, the less MU they tended to
allocate to the responder. The reverse was found for anticipated
regret, although in the fair condition the negative relation between
FIGURE 4 | Offer level (number of MU allocated to responder) as a function of anticipated pride and behavior condition in Study 2.
FIGURE 5 | Offer level (number of MU allocated to responder) as a function of anticipated regret and behavior condition in Study 2.
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anticipated regret and number of MU allocated to the responder
did not reach significance.
Overall, participants anticipated more pride in the fair condi-
tion than in the unfair condition, and anticipated more regret in
the unfair condition than the fair condition. In particular, there
was very little anticipated regret in the fair condition. The latter
may help to account for the non-significance of the simple slope
of regret in the fair condition.
Asking people about either anticipated pride or anticipated
regret increased the offer level in the unfair condition. Although
this pattern of results for the direct effects of the behavior con-
dition and the emotion condition on offer level differed from the
one we had originally predicted, it can nevertheless be seen as
consistent with our general theorizing. At first glance it may seem
surprising that both emotion conditions led to higher offers in the
unfair condition. However, when we take into account the direct
effects of behavior condition on anticipated emotions, we can see
that participants reported low levels of anticipated pride and high
levels of anticipated regret in the unfair condition. Because low
pride and high regret are related to higher offers in the unfair con-
dition, it would appear that both emotion conditions (pride and
regret) made participants think about how they would feel after
acting unfairly, and that this increased offer levels in both cases.
Although this interpretation is post hoc and therefore remains ten-
tative, it is consistent with the fact that when participants were
asked to consider making an unfair offer but were not asked to
report their anticipated emotions, the result was a significantly
lower average offer.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In two studies we found that participants’ decisions about how
to allocate resources between self and other are associated with
the emotions that are anticipated as a result of their decision.
The more that participants anticipated feeling proud about act-
ing fairly, the higher were the offers they made to anonymous
others; the more that participants anticipated feeling regret about
acting fairly, the lower were the offers they made to anonymous
others. Likewise, the more that participants anticipated feeling
proud about acting unfairly, the lower were the offers they made
to anonymous others; and the more that participants anticipated
feeling regret about acting unfairly, the higher were the offers they
made to anonymous others. These findings are consistent with the
argument that decision makers take the emotional consequences
of their decisions into account when making decisions (Mellers
et al., 1999; Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003), and with the broader
argument that anticipated emotions shape behavior (Baumeister
et al., 2007).
Interestingly, the fact that participants who anticipated feeling
proud about fair behavior or regret about unfair behavior were
willing to part with some of their potential material winnings
demonstrates that future emotions can be as important to par-
ticipants as potential monetary rewards. This shows that people
not only strive to maximize their gains, but also strive to feel good
(or to not feel bad). In this sense positive emotions (or absence of
negative emotions) can compensate for material loss or be an addi-
tional incentive for material gains. This means that decisions that
people make when distributing resources between themselves and
another person are better understood when anticipated emotions
are taken into account.
It is noteworthy that overall participants more readily antic-
ipated pride in relation to the prospect of behaving fairly and
regret in relation to the prospect of behaving unfairly. This reflects
the fact that the “default” decision in the UBG is to distrib-
ute the resources equally between proposer and responder. The
modal proposed division of resources is 50:50 and very unfair
offers are rare (Güth et al., 1982; Messick, 1993; Camerer, 2003).
Despite some cross-cultural variability, this basic pattern has even
been replicated in small-scale societies (Henrich et al., 2005), and
has been interpreted as reflecting a social preference for inequity
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).
In discussing the results of Study 1 we argued that the fact
that we measured a range of anticipated emotions (tapping both
pride and regret) may have led participants to think more generally
about the emotions that they expected to experience as a function
of their resource allocation decisions, thereby undoing the influ-
ence of the recalled emotion. In Study 2 we therefore asked only
about one anticipated emotion construct (pride or regret, plus a
no emotion control condition). We found that in the unfair condi-
tion – where participants were asked to contemplate a 45:5 split in
favor of them – asking about either pride or regret led to increased
offers relative to the control condition. Thus, rendering future
emotions salient led to fairer decisions irrespective of the specific
emotion on which participants focused. This suggests that inter-
ventions aimed at making people think about how they will feel if
they behave one way or the other may increase the probability of
decisions that conform to the socially normative behavior in the
respective situation. We argue that this is because – once they are
led to think about it – most people will feel better about engaging
in, rather than acting contrary to, the behavior that they consider
to be socially normative. It would appear that the social prefer-
ence for inequity aversion is sufficiently strong and widespread
in society that participants anticipate, on average, less pride and
more regret in relation to unfair allocations than in relation to fair
allocations, with the result that offer levels were higher in both con-
ditions. Whether alternative manipulations could not only change
the saliency of future emotional states, but also induce specific
anticipated emotions that exert discrete effects on behavior is an
important challenge for future research in this area.
But even if our manipulation simply affected the salience of
anticipated emotions, we believe that the practical implications of
our findings are potentially substantial. Note that the manipula-
tion we used was short and easy to administer. People were simply
asked to consider what they would feel if they were to behave one
way or the other. The result of this (irrespective of which emotion
they focused on) was that they behaved in a fairer manner than they
did when only considering the outcome of their choices. Whether
similar interventions reminding people of the possible emotional
consequences of their actions and inactions could have socially
beneficial effects when printed on tax return forms, library books,
office pens, or communal kitchen sinks is worth future research
attention.
The present research illustrates one important yet relatively
neglected way in which people can regulate their emotions in
interpersonal settings: in order to regulate their feelings people
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modify the situation (Gross and Thompson, 2007). People antici-
pate how their actions will affect the self and others, and how they
themselves are likely to feel as a result. This then influences the
decisions that people make. The particular forecast of how they
are likely to feel may be informed by past experiences in simi-
lar situations. Importantly, however, the absolute accuracy of this
forecast of their feelings is unimportant, as long as it is relatively
accurate in the sense that it indexes whether a given outcome is
more likely to give rise to feelings of (for example) regret than of
pride.
In conclusion, when making resource allocation decisions peo-
ple take into account how they would feel if they were to do this in
ways that vary with respect to fairness, and then make allocations
that are informed by these anticipated emotions. In this way,
people regulate their own emotions in social situations, giving
themselves the opportunity to experience positive emotions such
as pride and avoiding the experience of negative emotions such
as regret. Interestingly, these anticipated emotions are enough of
an incentive for people to sacrifice potential monetary gains. The
pride people anticipate about acting fairly leads people to act fairly.
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